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This paper investigates the dynamic effects of monetary and fiscal policy in a 
monetary union, which is characterized by asymmetric interest rate transmission. This 
asymmetry gives rise to intertemporal reversals in the relative effectiveness of policy 
on member country outputs. The direction and the number of these reversals depend 
on whether policies are unanticipated or anticipated. We also study the coordination 
between monetary and fiscal policy in a monetary union. Monetary policy may 
completely stabilize European output after unanticipated fiscal policy shocks. With 
anticipated fiscal policy shocks, complete stabilization throughout the overall 
adjustment process requires monetary policy to be time-inconsistent. 
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Prior to the establishment of European Monetary Union (EMU) in 1999, the policy 
discussion focused almost exclusively on asymmetric shocks as a source of 
differential macroeconomic developments and adjustment problems within EMU. 
This emphasis implicitly assumed the macroeconomic structures in the member 
countries to be symmetric. In the presence of macroeconomic asymmetries, however, 
even symmetric shocks may be responsible for adjustment problems within EMU.
1 
This also raises the question whether the common monetary policy by the European 
Central Bank (ECB) affects the EMU member countries in a symmetric fashion. 
While the ECB focuses on euro wide macroeconomic variables and is unable to 
respond to differential output developments within the EMU, it is nevertheless 
important to know the extent of comovement of macroeconomic variables such as 
output and inflation within the monetary union (ECB, 1999a and 1999b). 
 
Differences in financial structure, in the degree of openness towards the rest of the 
world or in the nature of the supply side are potential sources of asymmetric monetary 
transmission in EMU.
2 To date, it is fair to conclude that most of the discussion has 
concentrated on asymmetries in financial structure and their implications for the 
impact of changes in interest rates on aggregate demand.
3  
 
This paper also focuses on asymmetries in interest rate transmission in EMU and 
investigates the implications of this asymmetry in a dynamic macroeconomic context. 
The theoretical approach analyzes over time the spillover effects within EMU as well 
as between EMU and the rest of the world arising from interest rate, real exchange 
rate and output developments.  
 
Asymmetric interest rate transmission may originate from two sources: It may be 
rooted in a different pass-through behavior of banks in the transmission of policy 
impulses to the private sector. Asymmetries in the strength of pass-through behavior 
may stem from differences in legal structure of banking systems across the EMU 
member countries (Cecchetti, 1999). Asymmetries in the speed  of pass-through 
behavior of banks also receive attention (Cottarelli and Kourelis, 1994 and Mojon, 
2000). Assuming symmetric banking behavior, another source of asymmetric interest 
rate transmission may be different income and wealth effects of households and firms, 
which in turn originate in differences in financial structure across EMU member 
countries (Bank for International Settlements, 1994 and 1995 and ECB, 2000). In fact, 
recent empirical evidence supports the view that EMU member countries may respond 
differently to interest rate impulses of the ECB.
4 
 
                                                           
1  Clausen  (2001) and De Grauwe (2000) contrast the monetary policy implications of asymmetric 
shocks and asymmetric macroeconomic structures. 
2 Clausen (2001) and Dornbusch et al. (1998) survey and evaluate various sources of asymmetric 
monetary transmission in Europe. 
3 Bank for International Settlements (1994 and 1995), Cecchetti (1999), Kakes (2000) and De Bondt 
(2000).  
4 See for example Ramaswamy and Sloek (1998), Dornbusch et al. (1998), and Ehrmann (2000). A 
recent survey is provided by Guiso et al. (1999).  2
The purpose of this paper is to examine the implications of asymmetric interest rate 
transmission for the policy effects across the EMU member countries. Most of the 
early work on stabilization policy in a monetary union specifies static and symmetric 
models (e.g., Läufer and Sundararajan 1994). Somewhat later work introduces 
asymmetries into static models of a monetary union (e.g., Daseking, 1996). This paper 
is among the first to explore the implications of asymmetries in a dynamic model of a 
small monetary union.
5 The dynamic setup allows for the explicit computation of 
adjustment paths in response to economic policy. Furthermore, it will be possible to 
analyze the impact of anticipated policy changes.  
 
We show that asymmetric interest rate transmission gives rise to intertemporal 
reversals in the relative effectiveness of policy on member country outputs. The 
direction and the number of these reversals depend on whether policies are 
unanticipated or anticipated. We also study the coordination between monetary and 
fiscal policy in a monetary union. Monetary policy may perfectly stabilize union 
output after unanticipated fiscal policy shocks. With anticipated fiscal policy shocks, 
however, complete stabilization throughout the overall adjustment process requires 
monetary policy to be time-inconsistent. Fiscal policies are often announced in 
advance, and we believe that this paper addresses for the first time in a dynamic 
context the specific challenges posed to a stability–oriented monetary policy by the 
ECB.  
 
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents a dynamic model of a monetary 
union. Two member countries are taken to be perfectly symmetric except for the semi-
interest elasticity of aggregate demand. In the following it is assumed that aggregate 
demand in member country 1 is more strongly affected by the level of short-term real 
interest rates. The sections 3 and 4 contain a discussion of the implications of this 
particular asymmetry for the dynamic effects of monetary and fiscal policy. Section 5 
evaluates the robustness of the results with respect to modifications of the model. 
Section 6 investigates the implications of a policy mix between monetary and fiscal 
policy. Monetary policy is assumed to take a contractionary stance in response to an 
expansionary fiscal shock, which may be unanticipated or anticipated. Section 7 
concludes and discusses the implications for the design of monetary and fiscal policy 
in Europe. Section 8 contains the appendix with detailed derivations of the main 
analytical results. 
 
2. The Model  
 
The monetary union consists of two member countries of equal size. It is taken to be 
small relative to the rest of the world. Equations (1) to (6) model its demand side. The 
supply side is given by the equations (7) to (12). 
 
(1) 
( ) ( ) 1 1 1 21 1 1 01 1 ) ( g p E i a y a a y
c + − − + =  () () +− + + − −− bb yb yb yb pp b 01 12 23 4 1 2 5 1
* τ  
(2) 
( ) ( ) 2 2 2 22 2 1 02 2 ) ( g p E i a y a a y
c + − − + =  () () +− + + − −− bb yb yb yb pp b 01 22 13 4 2 1 5 2
* τ  
                                                           
5 See also Wohltmann and Clausen (2001).  3
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c
11 1 2 2 3 =++ + αα α
* , α α α 123 1 ++=  
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c
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*  
(11)   () 2 1 2 1 1 0 1 p p f f f y − + + = τ  
(12)   () 1 2 2 2 1 0 2 p p f f f y − + + = τ  
 
The notation of the variables is as follows: y denotes real output, i the short-term 
nominal interest rate, g real government expenditure, p the  price level of the 
domestically produced good, e the common exchange rate with respect to the US, 
which is expressed as the amount of euro for one dollar, τ   the external terms of trade, 
m the nominal money stock, w the nominal wage,  y  the natural level of output and p
c 
the consumer price index. All variables are endogenous except for real government 
expenditure and the nominal money stock. A dot above a variable denotes the right 
hand side derivative with respect to time. A bar denotes the steady state value of the 
variable. E represents the expectations operator. 
 
The variables of the member countries are indexed by 1 and 2. Variables without 
index refer to aggregate values for the monetary union. The variables of the rest of the 
world are taken as exogenous and marked with an asterisk (*). With the exception of 
interest rates all variables are expressed in logarithms.
6 Due to the log-linear structure 
of the model the behavioral parameters are to be interpreted as elasticities or semi-
elasticities. All parameters are assumed to be positive. 
 
Equations (1) and (2) represent the IS-curves in both member countries.
 7 In the short-
run, output is demand-determined. The demand for domestic output in country 1 (y1) 
depends on (output-related) private consumption, real-interest-sensitive investment 
demand, real government expenditure g1, and the trade balance. As in Turnovsky 
(1986), the real interest rate is computed using expected inflation based on the 
consumer price index. We assume rational inflationary expectations 




j D D . Imports from the second member country and from the US 
depend on domestic output (b1y1). Exports to the second member country and to the 
US depend on the respective foreign outputs (b2y2, b3y*). The trade balance is also 
affected by the internal terms of trade with respect to the trading partner in the 
monetary union (p1-p2) and by the external terms of trade defined in (3) and (4). The 
                                                           
6 This implies that the aggregate output level 
2 / 1
2 1 2 1 2 1 ) ln( 2 ln ln Y Y Y Y y y y ⋅ = + = + =  is equal to 
twice the geometric mean of the underlying (unlogarithmized) output variables Y1  and Y2. 
7 Logarithmic Taylor approximations of IS curves are discussed in more detail in Bhandari (1997) and 
Argy (1994).   4
IS equation for member country 2 has an analogous structure. Corresponding 
parameters are assumed to be identical except for the interest-sensitivity of aggregate 
demand, which is allowed to differ across the member countries of the monetary 
union (a21≠ a22). We assume in the following a21>a22. 
 
Equation (5) represents money market equilibrium (LM) within the monetary union. 
The income elasticities and semi-interest elasticities of money demand are assumed to 
be identical. The aggregate European money stock m is exogenous due to the 
assumption of flexible external exchange rates. In contrast, the distribution of the 
money stock within the monetary union is endogenous and determined by money 
demand in the respective countries. As in Turnovsky (1986), the consumer price 
indices  p
c
1  and  p
c
2  are used as deflators of money demand. 
 
Equation (6) reflects perfect capital mobility within EMU as well as between EMU 
and the US. Interest rates across EMU are identical (i1=i2) since the nominal exchange 
rate is fixed within the union. In contrast, the exchange rate towards the rest of the 
world is allowed to be flexible. In this case, the level of interest rates in EMU will 
always equal the level in the US plus the expected rate of depreciation of the euro. 
Exchange rate expectations are assumed to be rational (E(  e)
 =  e). As in standard asset 
market approaches to the exchange rate we treat the nominal exchange rate as a jump 
variable and producer prices as sticky.
8 
 
Producer prices are set as a constant markup over wages such that the change in the 
producer price index equals the rate of change in nominal wages (eq. (7) and (8)). 
Nominal wages, in turn, are determined by expected inflation and by the current 
output gap. The responsiveness of nominal wages with respect to the current output 
gap is determined by the parameter δ . The inflationary expectations by wage setters 
are assumed rational and formed on the basis of the consumer price index 




j   . Equations (9) and (10) contain the definitions of the consumer 
price indices in the two EMU member countries. The corresponding weights add up to 
unity.  
 
Equations (11) and (12) model the long-run equilibrium level of output. Nominal 
wages are indexed to the consumer price index while firms take their employment 
decision on the basis of the producers’ real wage, which uses the price level of the 
domestically produced good as a deflator of nominal wages. It follows that the 
equilibrium levels of employment and output are positive functions of the equilibrium 
internal and external terms of trade (Wohltmann, 1994a). 
 
 
Long run equilibrium 
 
We abstract from factors generating sustained economic growth (such as technological 
progress or changes in the capital stock) so that in long run equilibrium real output is 
                                                           
8 On impact, interest rates in Europe, the terms of trade τ1 and τ2, the consumer prices 
c p1 and 
c p2  as 
well as the output levels y1 and y2 are also allowed to adjust instantaneously. Furthermore, all rates of 
change such as e D , p D  and 
c p D  are allowed to react immediately to exogenous shocks.    5
assumed to be stationary. Formally, this implies  0 = j y D  (j=1, 2). In contrast, nominal 
variables such as producer prices, consumer prices or the nominal exchange rate are 
allowed to be non-stationary when the rate of growth of the money stock is positive 
(i.e.,  ) 0 > m D . Given a constant positive rate of monetary growth in the long run, 
( ), 0 > = = const m m D D the rates of inflation and the rate of change of the exchange rate 
remain stationary ( 0 = = = e p p
c
j j D D D D D D ). This implies in conjunction with the interest 
parity condition (6) that nominal and real interest rates in Europe are ultimately 
constant:  1 2 1 const i i = = and  2 2 2 1 1 const p i p i
c c = − = − D D . Total differentiation of the IS 
equations (1) and (2) and the LM equation (5) generates further steady state 
properties:  2 1 0 p p p m
c D D D D D − = − = = τ  where  2 1 τ τ τ + =  and 
c c c p p p 2 1 + = . Due to 
) * ( 2 e p p + − = τ  and  τ α 3 2 1 + = + =
c p p p p  w e  a l s o  f i n d :   w p m D D D = =  and 
e p p m D D D D = = = 2 1 2
1
.
9 The price adjustment equations (7) and (8) imply that the output 
levels y1 and y2  ultimately reach their long run equilibrium levels  1 y  and  2 y , which in 
turn are endogenously determined by (11) and (12). 
 
 
Initial equilibrium conditions 
 
The initial equilibrium of the system is normalized such that corresponding variables 
in the two economies are identical. For example, the initial values of the output 
variables y1 and y2 are identical because both member countries of the monetary union 
are assumed to be of equal size. Furthermore, we assume that the initial rate of 
monetary growth equals zero  ) 0 ( 0 = m   and the level of the money stock is initially 
constant ). ( 3 0 const m =  This implies constant and identical initial steady state values 
of the price levels at t = 0 ( 4 20 10 const p p = = ). Some asymmetries in parameters 
need to be introduced. Due to the assumption aa 21 22 >  w e  a l s o  h a v e  t o  a s s u m e  




                                                           
9 It would be incorrect to work with  m e D D = as intuition might suggest. The monetary aggregate m is 
derived from the underlying LM equation through log-linearization. Denoting the underlying levels of 
the aggregate money stock with M and of money demand with ) 2 , 1 ( = j L P j
c
j , money market 
equilibrium implies  2 2 1 1 L P L P M
c c + = . Provided that the initial values of money demand are identical 
in both member countries and using the approximation  0 0 ln ln / M M M dM − ≈ it is possible to derive 







1 , i.e.,  m 
2
1
equals the growth rate of the underlying monetary 
aggregate and the steady state relationship is then given by  e m D D =
2
1 . 
10 The difference of (1) and (2):    []
d d d p b b g a a i a a y ) 2 ( * 2 ) 1 ( ) (
2
1
5 4 02 01 3 22 21 + − + − + − − − = ⋅ τ α µ D  
with 2 1 y y y
d − = ,  2 1 g g g
d − = , 2 1 p p p
d − = ,  2 1 1 1 b b a + + − = µ . The initial equilibrium conditions 
0 0 0 0 0 = = = = τ D d d d p g y  then imply that  . 0 * ) ( 22 21 02 01 > − = − i a a a a   6
Solution of the model 
 
Models of a monetary union are commonly solved using the decomposition method by 
Aoki (1981). Aoki shows that if the underlying macroeconomic structure of the two 
EMU member countries is symmetric it is convenient to analyze two subsystems of 
the model. An aggregate system describes the aggregate behavior of EMU with 
respect to the rest of the world. A difference system models the behavior within the 
monetary union. The solutions from the two subsystems are then combined to 
generate the solutions for the variables in the model.  
 
In this model, both EMU member countries are assumed to be identical except for the 
semi-interest elasticity of aggregate demand. In order to continue to exploit the 
decomposition method introduced by Aoki, it is assumed that the weights of the 
internal producer prices in the consumer price index are identical across the EMU 
member countries (α 1= α 2).
11 With this assumption, the adjustment dynamics can still 
be illustrated in phase diagrams. Moreover, it is possible to isolate the impact of 
different interest sensitivities of aggregate demand from the implications of different 
real interest rate developments across the union. With α 1= α 2, the consumer price 
indices as well as the rates of inflation based on the consumer price index are identical 
in the two member countries  ) ( 2 1
c c p p   = . In conjunction with the uniform short-term 
interest rate within EMU this implies that the short-term real interest rate is identical 
across the EMU member countries  ) ( 2 1 1 1
c c p i p i   − = − . It follows that any differences 
in output are entirely driven by the asymmetric interest sensitivities of aggregate 





The aggregate system is derived by adding the relevant equations for the two 
countries. Its dynamic behavior can be described by a two-dimensional state space 
representation. As we allow for positive rates of monetary growth and therefore non-
stationary values of prices and nominal exchange rates we use - following Buiter and 
Miller (1982) - the terms of trade  ) * ( 2 e p p + − = τ  as and the real money stock m - p 
as state variables.
 The terms of trade are non-predetermined whereas the real money 
stock  p m−  is taken as predetermined.
 13 The aggregate system is described by the 
following dynamic system (see Wohltmann, 1994a and the appendix): 
 
(13) 











                                                           
11 See Wohltmann et al. (1998). The assumption of identical preferences for the final goods produced 
within the two countries is standard in the “new open economy macroeconomics” (Lane, 1995), and 
especially in the redux model by Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995). 
12 On the other hand, this assumption may be considered unduly restrictive and somewhat 
counterfactual. We therefore consider in section 5 the implications of assuming α 1 > α 2 and evaluate the 
robustness of our results.  
13 In contrast, the consumption based real money stock 
c p m −  responds discontinuously because p
c 
contains the jump variable e. Due to  τ α 3 + − = − p m p m
c , we find the difference between both 
measures of the real money stock to be proportional with τ .  7
(14)  () () () () p m p m
l
c p m − − − + − = −
2
1
τ τ D D  




















α δ λ α
α δ
. Given  () αλ δ α 33 2 10 −− > a , the determinant 
of the system matrix is unambiguously negative so that we find one stable and one 
unstable root.
14 The aggregate system displays saddle path stability because the 
number of predetermined variables equals the number of stable characteristic roots. 
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The dynamics of adjustment are illustrated in a phase diagram using the terms of trade 
and the real money stock as state variables. The implications for European output can 
be derived from the price adjustment equations (7) and (8) in conjunction with the 
definitions of the consumer price index and of the external terms of trade. It can be 
easily shown that the sign of the rate of change of the terms of trade provides 




α D 3 + = y y . 
 
As long as the euro experiences a real appreciation (i.e.,  D τ  > 0), European output 
exceeds the full employment level. Put alternatively, output above capacity induces 




Output developments across the EMU member countries are represented by the 
following relationship: 
 
(16) yy 12 − =
d d d d d p y p y y D D
δ δ
α α 1 1 2 1 + =
+ −
+ =                          ( 2 1 α α = )       
 
where the inflation differentials across Europe are governed by:  
 
(17)  D p
d  =  DD pp 12 −  = r0 ( pp















                                                           
14 See Buiter and Miller (1982) and Wohltmann (1993, 1994b) for a more detailed discussion of this 
class of saddle path models and an economic interpretation of the stability condition.  8
with  () µ
δ
µ α α
δ ) 2 (
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− = < 0 and  ~ a2 =
1
2
(aa 21 22 − ) > 0 since 
aa 21 22 > .
15 
 
These equations illustrate the link between the aggregate system and the difference 
system. The rate of change of the terms of trade  D τ  drives inflation differentials within 
EMU (17), which in turn affect relative output developments (16). Note that in this 
model the rate of change of the terms of trade implicitly reflects the level of real 
interest rates in Europe relative to the steady state level:  
 
(18)  = − = −




− − i . 
 
As long as the euro experiences a real appreciation ( i.e.,  D τ  > 0), real interest rates in 
Europe are necessarily below their steady state level i
*.
16 These real interest rate 
developments represent the mechanism by which the asymmetric output developments 
across EMU are incurred. The relevance of this source of asymmetric output 
developments across EMU increases with the size of the differences between the 
interest-sensitivities of aggregate demand (~ a2  in (17)). 
 
The overall solution for macroeconomic variables of the individual EMU member 
countries are derived on the basis of a linear combination of the solutions above. For 
example, member country outputs are gathered using the following formula:  
 
(19)  () () [] yy y y y 12 1 2 1 2
1
2
=+ ± − . 
 
The model and the solution technique allow for the discussion of stabilization policy 
in a monetary union in the presence of asymmetric interest rate transmission across 
the EMU member countries. 
 
 
3. Effects of Monetary Policy 
 
The implications of ECB policy are discussed in the form of an increase in the growth 
rate of the European money stock. These policies may be unanticipated or anticipated. 
In the discussion of the policy effects, we start with the impact in the steady state and 
then turn to the adjustment dynamics. 
 
An increase in the growth rate of the European money stock (dm D > 0) leaves in the 
steady state the external terms of trade τ  unchanged (Wohltmann, 1994a). This implies 
a one-to-one increase in aggregate inflation and in nominal interest rates while the 
                                                           
15 Equation (17) illustrates that the dynamic behavior of the difference system reduces to a (stable) 
differential equation, which describes the price level differential in Europe 
d p . For details see the 
appendix. 
16 Here we assume for simplicity that the foreign rate of inflation equals zero such that foreign nominal 
and real interest rates are identical.  9
level of real interest rates remains unchanged. Money demand depends on the nominal 
interest rate such that its rise in the steady state is accompanied by a fall in the real 
money stocks m - p and m - p
c. In contrast, aggregate demand depends on the real 
interest rate, which remains unchanged. These implications of an increase in the 
growth rate of the European money stock are illustrated in Figure 1. The initial 
equilibrium is given by Q0. The corresponding stable branch of the saddle path is 
denoted by S0 while the unstable branch is horizontal and given by I0. The increase in 
the growth rate of the money stock induces a leftward shift of the stable branch of the 
saddle path (S0 →  S1) while leaving the locus of the unstable path unchanged. The 
new steady state equilibrium is given by Q1. 
 
The dynamic adjustment towards the new steady state Q1 depends on whether the 
increase in the growth rate of the money stock is unanticipated or anticipated. An 
anticipated  increase in the growth rate of the money stock means that the ECB 
credibly announces at t=0 that at some future date T the growth rate of the money 
stock will be raised. This induces on impact a real depreciation of the euro (Q0 →  A). 
Between the announcement and the implementation of the policy, prices in Europe 
gradually rise in anticipation of the expansionary monetary policy. These inflationary 
developments bring about a real appreciation and a fall in the real money stock (A →  
B). In technical terms, the system moves along a trajectory, which still refers to the 
original equilibrium and gradually approaches the unstable branch I0 . 
 
At the date of implementation T, the terms of trade and the real money stock remain 
unchanged since the policy was perfectly anticipated. After the implementation of the 
increase in the growth rate of the money stock, the rate of inflation exceeds the growth 
rate of the money stock and the rate of currency depreciation such that real money 
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Figure 1: Aggregate Effects of an Increase in European Money Growth 
 
An unanticipated increase in the growth rate of the money stock at time t=0 is a 
special case. It induces on impact a real depreciation towards the rest of the world. In  10
contrast, the producer price level and the nominal money stock are initially given such 
that the real money stock remains unchanged. In consequence, Figure 1 illustrates the 
impact effect as a vertical movement (Q0 →  A’). The level of the terms of trade, 
which is attained immediately after the policy disturbance is denoted by  () τ 0+ . 
During the subsequent adjustment process, the euro experiences a real appreciation 
until the initial terms of trade are reestablished. The real money stock declines 
throughout the adjustment period. This implies that the rate of inflation exceeds the 
new rate of growth of the money stock throughout the adjustment process. 
 
Irrespective whether monetary policy is unanticipated or anticipated, the rate of 
change of the terms of trade  D τ   is positive throughout the subsequent adjustment 
process. This implies according to (18) that the level of real interest rates in Europe 
necessarily falls in response to the expansionary monetary policy by the ECB.
17 
Stimulated by the real depreciation of the euro and by the fall in real interest rates, 
European output  2 1 y y y + =  exceeds the equilibrium level of output throughout the 
subsequent adjustment process (Figure 2). After the initial jump, aggregate output 
converges monotonically towards the unchanged steady state level  y . This qualitative 
pattern of output adjustment holds for both types of monetary policy. In quantitative 
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Figure 2: Aggregate Output Effects of an Increase in European Money Growth 
 
We now turn to the differential output effects within EMU, which are represented in 
Figure 3. The increase in the growth rate of the money stock, whether unanticipated or 
anticipated, was demonstrated to lower on impact European real interest rates. Given 
that country 1 has a relatively higher real interest sensitivity of aggregate demand it 
will initially experience stronger output effects and inflationary pressure. The 
difference between the two member country outputs  yy y
d =− 12  is therefore initially 
positive ( y
d (0+) > 0). In the course of the adjustment process, real interest rates as 
                                                           
17 In contrast, nominal interest rates rise. This follows from the money market equation. The nominal 
money stock remains in both cases initially unchanged. Following the depreciation of the euro, import 
and consumer prices rise which reduces the real money supply. However, money demand increases with 
the rise in output. The excess demand for money drives up nominal interest rates. 
18 The size of the initial jump of τ , τ  and, consequently, in  y  falls with increasing T. This is a well-
known result, which also holds in other models in this class (see Turnovsky (2000), p. 191).  11
well as the terms of trade begin to rise towards their initial steady state values. This 
dampens the initial expansionary impact on aggregate demand leading over time to a 
fall in output in both member countries. This dampening effect will be comparatively 
stronger in country 1 where the real interest sensitivity of aggregate demand is higher. 
Furthermore, from the perspective of country 1, the internal and external terms of 
trade start to increase as a consequence of the stronger initial stimulus leading to a 
deterioration of the overall trade balance of country 1. 
 
It follows that the fall in output over time is stronger in country 1 than in country 2. 
The difference variable  2 1 y y y
d − =  begins to fall and at some stage during the 
adjustment process, which is labeled t*, a reversal in the relative effectiveness of ECB 
policy with respect to output in the EMU member countries takes place. As long as t 
< t*, monetary policy is more effective with respect to output in country 1 with the 
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Figure 3: Differential Output Effects of an Increase in European Money Growth 
 

















































With both r0 < 0 and r1 < 0, t* is necessarily positive. Note that the timing of the 
policy effectiveness reversal does not depend on whether monetary policy is 
unanticipated or anticipated. Furthermore, in the case of anticipated policy, t* is also 
independent from the time span T between the announcement and the implementation 
of policy. This means that the policy effectiveness reversal may occur before or after 
the announced date of implementation T. 
 
                                                           
19 Formally, the variable 
d y changes sign at t*, being positive for t < t* and negative for t > t*. 
20 This formula is derived in the appendix (see also Turnovsky (1986), Footnote 8.). In addition, the 
appendix shows that  t* is independent from T.  12
The expressions for the characteristic roots provide information on the determinants 
of the timing of the policy effectiveness reversal. For example, a larger sensitivity of 
the trade balance with respect to changes in the terms of trade as measured by the 
parameters  b4 and b5 is associated with an earlier reversal in the relative policy 
effectiveness. Country 1 is initially more strongly affected by monetary policy and 
experiences stronger inflationary pressure. This leads to a worsening of 
competitiveness towards the other member country and towards the rest of the world, 
which dampens the initial expansionary effect. Simulations based on plausible 
parameter values confirm that this dampening effect increases in the parameters b4 
and b5 and speeds up the policy effectiveness reversal.
21 
 
Furthermore, t* is affected by the average interest sensitivity of aggregate demand in 
Europe (a2) but invariant with respect to the degree of asymmetry in interest rate 
transmission across the EMU member countries ( ~ a2). A larger spread in the interest 
sensitivity of aggregate demand will be accompanied by a larger initial cyclical 
divergence across the EMU member countries (i.e., a rise in  y
d (0+)), but this 
difference will also be narrowed more rapidly. These two effects exactly balance each 
other with respect to the timing of the policy effectiveness reversal.  
 
Despite the fact that the formula for t* does not include  2
~ a  it has to be noted that the 
policy effectiveness reversal as such requires some asymmetry in interest rate 
transmission. In the extreme case of symmetric interest rate transmission, i.e., 
22 21 a a = or  2
~ a = 0, and given a symmetric shock such as  0 > m d D all time paths in the 
difference system equal zero throughout the overall adjustment process and a policy 
effectiveness reversal no longer exists. 
 
Provided that the stability condition continues to hold, an increase in the average 
interest sensitivity of European aggregate demand a2 leads to an earlier reversal. A 
large value of a2 is accompanied by a large absolute value of r1, which implies that 
the external terms of trade converge more rapidly to their original steady state level. 
Equation (18) then states that real interest rates also converge more quickly to their 
initial levels. This leads to an earlier reversal in the relative effectiveness of ECB 
policy across the EMU member countries.
22  
 
The output paths in the two member countries represent the mean of the aggregate 
European output and the differential output developments across EMU. The solutions 
are presented in Figure 4. The equilibrium levels of output are unaffected by a change 
in the growth rate of the European money stock. Member country outputs remain 
above the respective full employment levels throughout the adjustment period. 
                                                           
21 Note, however, that  0 / * < ∂ ∂ j b t  (j = 4, 5) does not hold for all theoretically admissible parameter 
values. 
 















Figure 4: Member Country Output Effects of an Increase in European Money Growth 
 
In summary, we find the following effects of a monetary expansion.
23 On impact, the 
level of short-term real interest rates in Europe unambiguously falls. Monetary policy 
is initially always more effective in the member country with the relatively larger 
interest sensitivity of aggregate demand. The presence of asymmetric interest rate 
transmission in Europe introduces exactly one reversal in the relative effectiveness of 
ECB policy on output in the EMU member countries.
24 The timing of the policy 
effectiveness reversal does not depend on whether monetary policy is unanticipated or 
anticipated.  
 
4. Effects of Fiscal Policy 
 
An expansionary fiscal policy is assumed to take the form of a symmetric increase in 
real government expenditure in all EMU member countries ( 0 2 1 > = dg dg ).
25 This 
policy has lasting real effects. In the long run, it will induce a real appreciation of the 
euro and a rise in the equilibrium level of output in Europe (Wohltmann, 1994a). The 
money market equilibrium condition (5) implies that the expansionary fiscal policy is 
necessarily associated with a fall in the consumer price level in Europe. In contrast, 
the impact on the equilibrium level of producer prices is ambiguous. Using the 
producer price index as a deflator of money demand, the steady state equilibrium 
condition in the money market can be reformulated as: 
 
                                                           
23 The output effects of an increase in the level of the European money stock ) 0 ( > dm  are very similar 
to the above results. The qualitative behavior of output in Europe as well as in the individual EMU 
member countries and the timing of the policy effectiveness reversal are identical.  However, the 
relative quantitative impact of the two types of monetary policy on European output differs and depends 
on the semi-interest elasticity of money demand.  
24 If additional macroeconomic asymmetries are introduced there may be more than one policy 
effectiveness reversal in response to the common monetary policy by the ECB. See for a simultaneous 
introduction of supply side asymmetries and multiple reversals in relative policy effectiveness 
Wohltmann and Clausen (2001). 
25 In this section, we assume for the ease of interpretation that the level of the money stock is fixed at 
3 0 const m m = = . This implies  0 = m D , long-run price stability  0 = p D and a stationary steady state not 
only in real but also in nominal variables.  14
(21) mp l l y l i −= − + + − ατ30 12 22
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Two factors are at work: the real appreciation towards the rest of the world lowers 
import prices, which taken by itself requires a rise in the producer price level to 
equilibrate the money market. On the other hand, the rise in equilibrium output and 
real money demand requires a rise in real money balances and therefore producer 
prices to fall. It is plausible to assume that the first effect dominates the latter such 
that the fiscal expansion in Europe is associated with a rise in the producer price level 
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Figure 5: Aggregate Effects of an Increase in European Government Expenditure 
 
The implications of a symmetric increase in government expenditure in Europe are 
illustrated in Figure 5. The initial equilibrium is given by Q0. The increase in 
government expenditure in Europe results in a rightward shift of the stable branch of 
the saddle path (S0 →  S1). The locus of the unstable path shifts upwards (I0 →  I1). The 
new steady state equilibrium is given by Q1 with an improvement in the terms of trade 
and a fall in the real money stock. The dynamics of adjustment again depend on 
whether the expansionary fiscal policy is unanticipated or anticipated. 
 
An anticipated symmetric increase in government expenditure in Europe means that 
the European governments credibly announce at t=0 that at some future date T 
government expenditure will be raised. On impact, this induces a discontinuous real 
appreciation of the euro (Q0  →  A ). Between the announcement and the 
implementation of the expansionary fiscal policy, prices in Europe gradually fall, 
which brings about a real depreciation and a rise in the real money stock (A →  B). At 
                                                           
26 The appendix shows that  ( ) () ( ) () 1 5 1 1 3 2 1 / / f b f l g g p m λ α + − − = + ∂ − ∂  so this requires α 3 > l1f1, 
which is likely to be met. The income elasticity of money demand l1 is often found to be unity. Note that 
the parameter f1 in (11) and (12) is linked to α 3 by f1 = α 3β  where the parameter β  reflects the elasticity 
of the labor supply with respect to the consumers’ real wage (Wohltmann  and Bulthaupt, 1999). 
Empirically, this elasticity is smaller than unity.   15
the date of implementation T, the terms of trade and the real money stock remain 
unchanged. After the implementation of the increase in government expenditure, the 
rate of inflation turns positive.
27 The real money stock falls and the terms of trade rise 
until the new equilibrium in Q1 is reached (B→  Q1). 
 
The special case T = 0, i.e., an unanticipated increase in real government expenditure, 
leads on impact to a real appreciation of the euro (Q0 →  A’). The euro appreciates 
further during the subsequent adjustment period until the new equilibrium terms of 
trade are attained (A’→  Q1). Throughout the adjustment process, the rate of inflation 
is positive and the real money stock declines.
28  
 
As the euro appreciates during the transition period, it follows from (15) that 
European output overreacts to the fiscal expansion. It increases on impact beyond the 
new higher equilibrium level of output. Furthermore,  D τ  > 0 implies in conjunction 
with (18) that the fiscal expansion in Europe is associated with a fall of real interest 
rates in Europe. An unanticipated expansionary fiscal policy is on impact 
accompanied by a crowding-in of private investment. This result follows from the fact 
that the rise in the rate of inflation necessarily exceeds in this model the increase in 
short-term nominal interest rates.
29 It follows that the country with the larger interest 
sensitivity of aggregate demand will also experience a relatively stronger boost in 
output in response to an expansionary fiscal policy in Europe.
30 
 
In contrast to the case of monetary policy, it matters whether fiscal policy is 
unanticipated or anticipated. The unanticipated fiscal expansion initiates a boom in 
European output. The announcement of a future increase in European government 
expenditure produces on impact a real appreciation and a rise in real interest rates, 
which incur a recession in Europe. In the period between the announcement and the 
implementation - the anticipation period - European output remains below the initial 
full employment level of output. In the period after implementation, the rate of change 
of the terms of trade is positive throughout the subsequent adjustment process. This 
implies that the level of real interest rates in Europe necessarily falls below the steady 
state level. Stimulated by the increase in government expenditure and by the fall in 
                                                           
27 Formally, the rate of inflation satisfies  p p D D < for t < T and  p p D D > for t > T.  We assume above  p D = 0. 
28 For completeness, we also discuss the case where the unanticipated fiscal expansion leads to a fall in 
the producer price level: The real money stock in the new steady state will be higher than the real 
money stock in the original equilibrium and the stable branch of the saddle path moves further to the 
northeast. The euro still appreciates on impact but this goes beyond the improvement in the equilibrium 
terms of trade. The transition period is characterized by a real depreciation of the euro with the 
corresponding implications for European output and real interest rates. 
29 In the case T = 0 we found  0 ) 0 ( > + τ   (cf. Figure 5). Using (18), the aggregate real interest rate in 
Europe falls on impact. Under fairly weak conditions we find  0 2 1 ) 0 )( ( ) 0 ( m p p p
c c c D D D D > + + = +   and 
0 ) 0 ( i i > + . While therefore both, nominal interest rates and consumer price inflation increase we know 
from  0 ) 0 ( > + τ   and (18) that the rise in inflation exceeds the increase in nominal interest rates. 
Furthermore, on impact, 
c p   increases less than  p   because  τ α    3 = −
c p p and  0 ) 0 ( > + τ  . See also the 
last Figure in section 6.2. 
30 For the sake of brevity, the adjustment patterns following an unanticipated fiscal policy are not shown 
graphically.  16
real interest rates in T, European output exceeds the new equilibrium level of output 
throughout the subsequent adjustment process (Figure 6). 
 
Figure 6 illustrates that anticipated fiscal policy may be responsible for a substantial 
variance of output around the equilibrium levels. Before T, European output stays 
below the original equilibrium level. After T, European output stays above the new 
equilibrium level. At the date of implementation T, European output overreacts to the 
fiscal expansion since the actual increase in European output exceeds the rise in 
equilibrium output ( yy 10 − ). The size of this jump in European output in T does not 
depend on the length of the anticipation period.
31 On the other hand, the size of the 
impact effect of anticipated fiscal policy on European output falls with T, i.e., falls 
with the length between the announcement and the implementation of policy. The 
qualitative adjustment of European output does not depend on the date of 
implementation. 
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We now turn to the differential output effects across the EMU (Figure 7). As shown 
above, the anticipated expansionary fiscal policy raises on impact European real 
interest rates. Correspondingly, country 1 initially experiences a stronger recession 
and more deflationary pressure than country 2. The difference between the two 
member country outputs  yy y
d =− 12   is initially negative ( y
d (0+) < 0). As a 
consequence of the relatively stronger recession in country 1, internal and external 
terms of trade start to fall. Competitiveness improves and output developments are 
more favorable in country 1 than in country 2. At some stage during the adjustment 
process a reversal in the relative effectiveness of anticipated fiscal policy with respect 
to output in the EMU member countries takes place and the variable y
d  turns positive.  
It can be shown that if the point of reversal occurs before the implementation date T it 
                                                           
31 It is shown in the appendix that the size of the jump in T,  ) ( ) ( − − + T y T y , is independent from T. 
This is a general result. Only the size of the initial jump depends on T. The reason for this difference in 
behavior is that the terms of trade jump at the time of the announcement, but stay continuous at the date 
of implementation.  17
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Figure 7: Differential Output Effects of an Anticipated Increase in Government 
Expenditure 
 
Whereas in the cases of monetary policy and of unanticipated fiscal policy, only one 
point of reversal can be identified, anticipated fiscal policy is always associated with 
two reversals in relative policy effectiveness. One point of reversal is given in t* ≤  T. 
A second point of reversal t**  necessarily occurs after the implementation of the 
expansionary fiscal policy. The increase in government expenditure in T leads to a fall 
in European real interest rates and stimulates country 1 more strongly. Prices in 
country 1 rise relative to those in country 2. The internal price differential p
d = p1 - p2 
increases for t > T and rises beyond the unchanged equilibrium price differential  p
d . 
Towards the end of the adjustment process, the price differential falls back to the 
unchanged equilibrium level ( C p
d   < 0). Using (16), this implies that the output 
differential  y
d  approaches its long run equilibrium from a situation in which  yy 12 −  
< 0. The formula for the timing of the second reversal in policy effectiveness t** is 
provided in the appendix. In the special case of an unanticipated increase in 
government expenditure, t** coincides with t* , which is given by (20). 
 
                                                           
32 The timing of the first policy effectiveness reversal t* is either before T or exactly at T. Figures 7 and 
8 illustrate the case t* < T. If the date of policy implementation T is not too distant in the future, the 
first reversal occurs at T. More formally, we find in the case T < t* where t* is defined by (20): 
) ( 0 ) ( + < < − T y T y
d d , i.e., the variable 
d y  experiences at the date of implementation T  a 





















Figure 8: Member Country Output Effects of an Increase in Government Expenditure 
 
Figure 8 shows the effects of the anticipated symmetric increase in European 
government expenditure on output in the individual EMU member countries. There 
are two reversals in relative policy effectiveness, which occur in t* and in t**. At the 
time of implementation, there is no reversal in the relative policy effectiveness since 
this policy is more effective in country 1 than in country 2 before and after T. Overall, 
it can be concluded that anticipated fiscal policy may initiate considerable cyclical 
asymmetries in the EMU. 
 
 
5. Modifications and Robustness 
 
This section introduces two modifications to the previous framework: At first, we 
relax the assumption  2 1 α α =  in the price index definitions 
c p1  and 
c p2  and assume 
instead a preference for the domestically produced good ( 2 1 α α > ). Secondly, we 
assume lagged instead of instantaneous output adjustment on the supply side. We 
show how these extensions modify the solution of the model and investigate the 
robustness of our previous results about the dynamic effects of monetary and fiscal 
policy. 
 
5.1 The case  2 1 α α >  
 
Assuming  2 1 α α >  implies that exogenous shocks lead to differential price index and 
inflation developments within the union. Given identical nominal interest rates, real 
interest rates 
c p i 1 1  −  and 
c p i 2 2  −  now differ across the union. The previous 
decomposition is no longer applicable because the aggregate system now depends on 
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System (22) has the saddle path property with one unstable  ) 0 / 1 ( 2 2 > = l r  and two 
stable roots  ) , ( 1 0 r r , where  0 0 1 < < r r . In contrast with the case  2 1 α α = , the 
aggregate variables now depend on the characteristic root and vector belonging to the 
difference variable  2 1 p p p
d − = . In principle, this introduces the possibility of non-
monotonous behavior of the aggregate variables in the interval  T t > . An anticipated 
increase in money growth has qualitatively the same implications for aggregate output 
and the output differential as in the case  2 1 α α =  (Figure 2 and 3). On impact, a real 
depreciation of the common currency boosts aggregate union output. This initial 
stimulus fades over time as the terms of trade τ  continuously increase and as real 
interest rates rise to the initial level. The output differential  2 1 y y y
d − =  increases on 
impact as a result of two factors. With  2 1 α α > , real interest rates fall more strongly in 
1 U  than in  2 U
34 and member country  1 U  is characterized by a relatively higher 
interest sensitivity of aggregate demand. The differential real interest rate 
development results from the difference in consumer price inflation,  which is 
initially positive  ) 0 ) 0 )( (( 2 1 > + −
c c p p D D . The relationship between consumer price and 
producer price inflation is given by  
 
(23) ) )( ( 2 1 2 1 2 1 p p p p
c c D D D D − − = − α α  
 
such that with  2 1 α α > , both inflation differentials respond in the same direction 
whereby the response of consumer price inflation differentials is relatively weaker. As 
a mirror image to inflation, the real interest rate differential can be expressed as 
 
(24) 
d c c c c p p p p i p i D D D D D ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( 2 1 2 1 2 2 1 1 α α − − = − − = − − −  
 
On impact,  ) 0 ( +
d p D >  0 and the real interest rate differential falls. Over time, the 
differences in producer price inflation lead to a gradual increase in the price level 
differential  2 1 p p p
d − = , which trigger a fall in the output differential. As with 
2 1 α α = , we find a reversal point t*  independent from T, after which the output 
                                                           
34 With  2 1 α α = , real interest rates behave identically. With  2 1 α α > ,  2 U  may actually experience an 
increase in real interest rates because 
c p i 2 2 D −  is equal to 







* α α τ α − + − −  and both, τ D  
and 
d p D , increase on impact. The initial (positive) output differential is definitely higher than in the case 
2 1 α α = .  20
differential turns negative, i.e., where output  2 y  exceeds  1 y .
35 The output differential 
is proportional to the producer price inflation differential 
d p D  
 
(25) 
d d d p y y D
δ
α α 2 1 1 + −
= −  
 
It follows that the inflation differentials 
d p D  and 
c c p p 2 1 D D −  as well as the output and 
real interest differentials change sign at the same date 
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Figure 9: Response of difference variables to  0 > m d D  with  2 1 α α >  
 
Figure 10 shows the response of the difference variables to an anticipated symmetric 
fiscal expansion in the union.
37 In contrast to the case of a monetary expansion, we 
find on impact a fall in the output differential, which results from the fact that the real 
interest rate in  1 U  increases more strongly than in  2 U
38 and that demand in  1 U  
responds more sensitively to interest rates than in  2 U . It follows that  1 p D  falls relative 
to  2 p D , which leads over time to a gradual fall in the producer price differential 
d p . 
The real interest rate differential falls correspondingly. There again exists a point in 
                                                           
35 As shown in the appendix, t* again satisfies (20), where  0 r  and  1 r  now denote the stable roots of 
system (22). 
36 Figure 9 also includes the special case  0 = T . The size of the effect in the case  0 = T exceeds the one 
for 0 > T . 
37 The aggregate variables behave qualitatively as in the case  2 1 α α =  (cf. Figures 5 and 6). In the 
special case  0 = T , the solution to the difference system is given by the adjustment paths to the right of 
T in Figure 10 . 
38 On impact, we find in the case  0 > dg  and  2 1 α α >  that  0 ) 0 ( < + τ D and 0 ) 0 ( < +
d p D , which implies 
that 








1 1 α α τ α − − − − = −  rises in  + = 0 t , while the increase in 








2 2 α α τ α − + − − = −  turns out to be unambiguously smaller. There is even a 
theoretical possibility that 
c p i 2 2 D −  actually falls on impact. The decline in the output differential 
d y  is 
stronger than in the case  2 1 α α = .  21
time  T t ≤
* , at which the variable 
d y  experiences a sign change and the relative 
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Figure 10:  Response of difference variables to  0 2 1 > = dg dg  with  2 1 α α >  
 
At the date of implementation T, the system experiences a discontinuous adjustment 
in the difference variables. The output differential further increases in T at which the 
real interest differential falls discontinuously. Towards the end of the adjustment 
process the development of the producer price differential gradually pulls back the 
output differential. In contrast to the case of monetary policy, we find a second sign 
change in the difference variable, i.e., a second cyclical reversal point 
* * t , so that for 
T t >  output in  1 U  ) ( 1 y  is initially above and for sufficiently large t ) (
* * t t >  below 
2 y . 
 
5.2 Gradual output adjustment in goods markets 
 
We now replace the assumption of instantaneous output supply adjustment in goods 
markets and introduce gradual adjustment as follows: 
 
(26)  ) 0 ; 2 , 1 ( ) ( ∞ < < = − = β β i y y y i
AD
i i D . 
 
AD
i y  represents aggregate demand in  i U  and is defined by the right hand side of the 
IS-equations (1) and (2). The speed of supply adjustment β  is assumed identical in 
both countries. The system dynamics are then determined by the following five 
dimensional differential equation system with the state variables 
)' , , , , ( p m p y y x
d d − = τ : 
 
                                                           
39 In the case  T t <
* , the reversal point 
* t  is identical with the one derived for monetary policy. If T is 
sufficiently small  ) (
* t T < , the reversal takes place discontinuously in T.  22
(27)  ) (
0 0
0 0 0 0




















































































































































Lagged output adjustment in goods markets transforms the output variables 
2 1 y y y + =  and  2 1 y y y
d − =  into predetermined variables. Thus, the state vector x 
now contains four predetermined variables  ) , , , ( p m p y y
d d −  and one non-
predetermined variable  ) (τ .  
 
The system matrix D = (dij) has a positive determinant and generally four stable roots 
) ,..., ( 4 1 r r  and one unstable root  ) / 1 ( 2 55 5 l d r = = , so the system continues to have the 
saddle path property (see appendix). Monetary and fiscal policy no longer incur an 
instantaneous jump in output. In consequence, y and 
d y  are on impact predetermined 
such that  0 ) 0 ( y y = +  and  0 ) 0 ( 0 = = +
d d y y . In conjunction with the relationships 
 
(28)  ) ( 3 y y − = ⋅ δ τ α D  
(29)  ) ( ) 1 ( 2 1
d d d y y p − = + − δ α α D  
 
it implies that, on impact, τ D =
d p D = 0. As a result of τ D =0, real interest rates also 
remain constant. An announced increase in the rate of monetary growth leads on  23
impact merely to a jump depreciation in e, which triggers an increase in demand for 
union output. Following (26), the union experiences a gradual increase in aggregate 
output (Figure 11). Using (28), this triggers a real appreciation, which in turn implies 
a fall in real interest rates. These conflicting effects on aggregate demand result in a 
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Figure 11: Response of aggregate output to  0 > m d   with lagged output adjustment 
 
The decline in real interest rates is stronger in  1 U  than in  2 U , which leads to a rise in 
the output differential
d y . This leads over time to an increase in the price differential 
d p , which in turn works towards a fall of 
d y . The output differential also 
experiences a hump shaped adjustment, which – as in the case with instantaneous 
output reaction ) ( ∞ = β  – shows a cyclical reversal (Figure 12). As shown in the 
appendix, this reversal point 







d y  
 
Figure 12: Response of output differential to  0 > m d   with lagged output adjustment 
 
Analogous adjustment patterns with the same reversal point in 
* t  follow for the 
inflation differentials 
d p   and 
c c p p 2 1   −  and - as a mirror image - for the real interest 
differential (Figure 9).   24
An  anticipated symmetric fiscal expansion ) 0 ( 2 1 > = dg dg  leads to an immediate 
increase in the terms of trade τ  and a lagged asymmetric increase in real interest 
rates, which generate a subsequent fall in the output variables y and 
d y . In the period 
between the announcement and the implementation, y and 
d y  only start to increase as 
long as T is sufficiently large. This case is presented in the Figures 13 and 14, where 
the adjustment of y and 
d y  in the interval  T t ≤ ≤ 0  is hump-shaped. For 
d y , we may 
have a reversal point 
* t  before T.
40 In contrast with the case of instantaneous output 
adjustment, y and 
d y  are continuous even in t=0 and T. After T, the model generates 
adjustment patterns for y and 
d y , which are qualitatively the same as with  ∞ = β . 




























Figure 14: Response of differential output to  0 2 1 > = dg dg  with lagged output 
adjustment 
 
                                                           
40 The reversal point 
* t  is identical with the one in the case of monetary policy. 
41 In contrast with the case  ∞ = β , both reversal points may here lie in the interval  ∞ < < t T .  25
The analysis of the impact of monetary and fiscal policy constitutes a background for 




6. Coordination between Monetary and Fiscal Policy  
This section analyzes the ability of monetary policy to neutralize the impact of 
symmetric unanticipated or anticipated demand shocks. These shocks may originate 
for example from a symmetric fiscal expansion in the union.  
In the derivation of the monetary policy reaction function we assume that the primary 
goal of monetary policy is price stability. This is interpreted in our model as the effort 
to minimize consumer price inflation.
42 Furthermore, according to the treaty of 
Maastricht, the ECB is required to support overall macroeconomic stability in the euro 
area. We assume therefore that the ECB also aims to dampen business cycles at the 




6.1 Monetary policy reaction in the base model 
The analytical solution to the aggregate and the difference system in the appendix 
shows that monetary policy can completely avoid cyclical divergences when it sets in 
the solution time path of the vector  ))' ( , ( p m − τ  the constants A1, A2 and  1
~ A  equal to 
zero. Under these conditions, anticipated demand shocks lead in T only to an 
immediate jump into the new steady state. Setting only A1 = A2 = 0 avoids 
announcement effects, i.e., the system stays in the initial equilibrium up to the 
implementation date T. 
With an unanticipated demand shock (T = 0), complete stabilization at the aggregate 
and difference level only requires  () 0 d ~
1 = − − = p m A , which means that the steady 
state level of the real money stock remains unchanged. Due to 
(30)  () g
f b
f l







− − = − D  
this requires a reduction in monetary growth as follows
44  
                                                           
42 The ECB targets consumer price inflation over the medium term. This is interpreted in terms of the 
model that it does not respond to one-time changes in the consumer price level, but monitors instead its 
rate of change. Another potential candidate in the evaluation of price stability is producer price 
inflation. It is shown below that the inflation rates based on the two price indices are proportional to 
each other in this model and require therefore qualitatively the same response of ECB policy.  
43 This can also be rationalized by numerous empirical analyses of the Taylor rule, which show that 
central banks typically also respond to cyclical conditions. A theoretical analysis of the optimal 
monetary policy design in the presence of macroeconomic asymmetries and central bank preferences of 
the Barro-Gordon type is provided by De Grauwe (2000).  














− = D  
This contractionary monetary policy means in conjunction with the expansionary 
fiscal impulse that both member countries immediately attain the new steady state 
values of their output variables y1 and y2. Furthermore, divergences in output 
developments across the union do not occur because real interest rates remain 
unchanged.
45 Note that differential output developments within the union can only be 
avoided by monetary policy as long as the initial demand disturbance is symmetric. 
With  symmetric  demand disturbances, the steady state values of the difference 
variables y
d and p
d remain unchanged such that the condition  () () 0 d = − p m  stabilizes 
not only the aggregate, but also the difference system. With an asymmetric demand 
disturbance of, say dg1 > 0 = dg2 , monetary policy (31) continues to perfectly stabilize 




The stabilizing impact of monetary policy (31) is illustrated in Figure 15. An 
unanticipated symmetric or asymmetric fiscal expansion leads to the adjustment 
process Q0DQ1, while the neutralizing monetary policy (31) has an exact opposite 
impact ( ' 1 0DQ Q ). If both policies occur simultaneously, the system jumps 
immediately into the new steady state Q2. The only difference compared with the 
initial equilibrium Q0 is an increase in τ  . The monetary policy (31) is consistent with 




Figure 15 also illustrates the monetary stabilization of an anticipated symmetric fiscal 
expansion. This fiscal policy has initially a contractionary and only after T an 
expansionary impact (cf. Figure 6). Thus, monetary policy has to react twice in order 
to stabilize the system in the anticipation period (0 < t < T) and in the period after 
implementation (t > T). The announcement effect of a future fiscal expansion on 
output is negative. In order to stabilize the system in the anticipation period, monetary 
policy has to announce in t = 0 an expansionary monetary policy for T. In the phase 
diagram, the contractionary implications of fiscal policy (Q0BC) can be neutralized 
when monetary policy generates a mirror image time path up to T, i.e.,  ' ' 0 C B Q . With 
these policies, the aggregate as well as the difference system remain in the initial 
equilibrium Q0.  
However, when the central bank actually raises monetary growth in T, it reinforces the 
already expansionary impulse, which results from the increase in government 
                                                           
45 With  0
~
1 = A , the aggregate and difference variables react as follows:  ) ( 0 1 y y y > ≡ ,  0 = ≡
d d y y  for 
all t > 0. 
46 In the case dg1 > 0 = dg2, we yield  0 d >
d p  and  0 d ) 2 ( d 2 1 > + =
d d p f f y . Then, 0
~
1= A  no longer 
implies that the differential variables y
d and p
d remain constant. These variables adjust monotonically to 
their new steady state levels, which do not depend on the aggregate variable τ D  (see appendix). 
47 In the long-run, inflation is determined by the rate of monetary growth such that the policy goal of 
price stability generally requires to keep monetary growth as low as possible. Policy conflicts arise 
when monetary policy has to turn more expansionary in order to neutralize the impact of contractionary 
shocks.  27
spending in T.
48 In addition, the rate of inflation 
c p   increases permanently. As long as 
price stability is the primary goal, monetary policy can only stabilize output in t > T 
when the central bank deviates from the announcement and pursues instead an 
unanticipated reduction in the rate of monetary growth in T. The appropriate size of 
the monetary contraction m D  is identical to the one derived for an unanticipated fiscal 
expansion and therefore determined by the reaction function (31).  
In the phase diagram, the failure to implement the previously announced expansionary 
expansion implies that the system moves in T vertically onto the saddle path S1 (Point 
D). The implementation of the unanticipated monetary contraction leads to a further 
vertical move into Q2. When the appropriate reduction in the rate of monetary growth 
m D  perfectly neutralizes the expansionary impact of fiscal policy
49, no further 
adjustment dynamics take place, so that Q2 – as in the case T = 0 – represents the final 
equilibrium. This monetary policy reaction to a symmetric fiscal expansion also 
stabilizes the difference system such that output and inflation behave symmetrically 
across the monetary union. Furthermore, the monetary contraction leads to a 
permanent reduction in the rate of inflation within the monetary union. 
Of course, the announcement of an expansionary monetary policy and the actual 
implementation of a contractionary policy can only be a successful strategy to 
stabilize the system as long as the announcement is credible
50, i.e., when the ECB has 
a reputation.
51 If the announcement is not credible then the private sector anticipates 
already in t = 0 the policy reaction (31) in T  > 0. This anticipated monetary 
contraction in T strengthens the already contractionary impact of the announced fiscal 
expansion in the anticipation period 0 < t < T. In addition, the period after 
implementation is not characterized by full stabilization. Instead, the output 
fluctuations after T are merely dampened.
52  
                                                           
48 Graphically this means a movement along the saddle path belonging to the initial equilibrium S0 from 
Q0 to the new steady state  ' 0 Q , which, in comparison with the new steady state Q1 under a passive 
monetary policy ( 0 d = m D ), is characterized by a larger decline in ( ) p m − . 
49 With a passive monetary policy, the expansionary fiscal policy causes an adjustment process along 
the saddle path S1 from D to Q1. The restrictive monetary policy  0 ) ( d < T m D  leads after the initial 
discontinuous movement DQ2 to the mirror adjustment process Q2E along the saddle path S2. With both 
policies taking place simultaneously, the aggregate system remains in the steady state Q2. 
50 The debate about the time inconsistency of optimal policy rules initiated by Kydland and Prescott 
(1977) showed that credibility, rational expectations and time inconsistency of systematic monetary 
policy rules are logically inconsistent. Given rational expectations, a time-inconsistent monetary policy 
rule cannot be credible. However, deviations from a systematic policy rule are still consistent with 
rational expectations as long as the policies are unanticipated. The private sector still regards the policy 
rule as credible as long as the central bank enjoys a high level of reputation. Obviously, if the central 
bank deviates from the policy rule too frequently, it loses its reputation and the policy rule loses its 
credibility (see more in Barro and Gordon (1983)). 
51 The ECB appears to have already established substantial credibility in its anti-inflationary stance. 
This can be inferred from the low level of inflationary expectations revealed in surveys and from the 
relatively low level of long-term nominal interest rates in Europe. 
52 The condition for stabilization in t > T (0
~
1 = A ) implies the following reaction function for monetary 
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α D . Due to h11 < 0 and  1 2 0 r r > > , this 
implies a stronger reduction in m D  than the reaction function (31). The anticipation of (31) means that 
the system does not jump in T but follows in Figure 15 a movement along the saddle path S2 from  28
The unanticipated monetary policy reversal creates a further problem that the central 
bank loses reputation such that monetary policy announcements cease to be credible. 
On the other hand, this monetary policy may be appropriate when the European 
economy is initially in a recession, when fiscal policy is too inflexible to be 
immediately implemented and when the ECB supports the expansionary fiscal stance 
in order to overcome the recession. The ECB policy then prevents a further worsening 
of the recession caused by the contractionary announcement effects of fiscal policy 
and stabilizes expectations. The deviation from the previously announced monetary 
policy may be rationalized on the grounds that this prevents a political business cycle. 
Real output is stabilized at a permanently higher level and the contractionary stance of 
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Figure 15: Reaction of monetary policy to  0 2 1 > = dg dg  
The implications of an announced fiscal expansion for inflation provide another 
rationale for a time-inconsistent reaction of monetary policy (Figure 16). The 
announcement of the expansionary fiscal package leads to an immediate fall in 
consumer and producer price inflation (
c p D and  p D ), which continues up to the date of 
                                                                                                                                                                      
below to the new steady state Q2. Then, the aggregate output level y falls for t > T . The difference 
compared with the new steady state  1 y  is smaller than in the case of a passive monetary policy 
0 ) ( d = T m D .  29
implementation T, where  p p
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Figure 16:  Response of inflation to  0 2 1 > = dg dg  
 
This deflationary episode can be avoided by the credible announcement in t = 0 about 
a suitable monetary expansion in T. The actual implementation of the expansionary 
fiscal policy induces an inflationary  process, whereby  p D  > 
c p D for  t > T. The 
implementation of the previously announced expansionary monetary policy gives a 
further boost to the inflationary process. On the other hand, an unanticipated reduction 
in  m D  leads to an immediate and permanent fall in consumer and producer price 
inflation. 
 
6.2 Modifications and robustness 
In the case of a preference for the home good and instantaneous output adjustment 
( ∞ = > β α α ; 2 1 ), monetary policy continues to be able to completely neutralize 
unanticipated shocks, which leave the steady state values of the difference system 
unchanged
54. The appropriate monetary policy is again determined by (31). A perfect 
stabilization of anticipated symmetric fiscal policies continues to be possible by the 
announcement of an expansionary monetary policy in t = 0 for T > 0 to be followed 
by an unanticipated reduction in the rate of monetary growth at the date of 
implementation T.
55 Ruling out such a time-inconsistent policy reaction, monetary 
                                                           
53 The price and wage adjustment equations imply  τ α δ D D D 3 ) ( = − = − y y p p
c . For t < T, we have  0 y y <  
and therefore 
c p p D D < . For t > T  we find  1 y y >  and thus 
c p p D D > . The behavior of  p D  and 
c p D  runs 
inversely to the development of the growth of the real money stocks  ) ( p m D D −  and  ) (
c p m D D − : Due to 
τ α D D D D D D D 3 ) ( ) ( ) ( − = − − = − − −
c c p p p m p m  it follows  0 > − > −
c p m p m D D D D  for t < T and 
0 < − < −
c p m p m D D D D  for t > T. The size of the jump in T does not depend on T. 
54 This result holds for symmetric shocks as long as the level of foreign interest rates remains 
unaffected. 
55 See the appendix.  30
policy is unable to achieve complete stabilization in both intervals 0 < t < T and t > T. 
As a modification of our results in the case  2 1 α α = , it is no longer possible for 
monetary policy to use policy announcements in order to neutralize in the interval t > 
T the effects of a symmetric fiscal impulse.
56  
The ability of monetary policy as a stabilization tool is significantly reduced by the 
presence of lagged output adjustment ( ∞ < β ). This introduces rich dynamics (cf. 
(27)), which pose a challenge for  a stability oriented monetary policy. In contrast with 
the case  ∞ = β , monetary policy no longer achieves complete stabilization of 
unanticipated shocks.
57 Furthermore, even allowing for time-inconsistent monetary 
policy responses it is no longer possible to completely stabilize anticipated symmetric 
fiscal policies in both periods. The room for monetary stabilization is confined to the 
announcement effects in the anticipation period where the contractionary 
announcement effects of a symmetric fiscal expansion can be neutralized by the 






The results of this paper can be summarized as follows: The country with the 
relatively larger interest sensitivity of aggregate demand is initially more strongly 
affected by the common monetary policy by the ECB. This holds irrespective whether 
monetary policy is implemented by an increase in the level or in the growth rate of the 
European money stock and also irrespective of whether the monetary policy is 
unanticipated or anticipated. The presence of asymmetric interest rate transmission 
causes one intertemporal reversal in the relative effectiveness of ECB policy on output 
across the EMU member countries. The paper shows that the timing of the policy 
effectiveness reversal is fairly robust across various types of monetary policy. 
Unanticipated fiscal policy does also lead to a reversal in policy effectiveness, which 
happens to be identical to the reversal point in the case of monetary policy. 
Anticipated fiscal policy leads to two reversals, the first of which being either 
identical to the one found previously or being at the date of implementation while the 
second one necessarily occurs after the implementation of fiscal policy. 
                                                           
56 In the case  2 1 α α = , complete stabilization in the interval t > T requires setting  0
~
1 = A . With  2 1 α α > , 
complete stabilization requires to set two independent constants ( 1
~
A  and  0
~
A ) equal to zero, which is 
impossible to achieve with only one monetary instrument (m D ). For details see the analytical appendix. 
57 Dynamic adjustment processes in response to exogenous shocks can only be avoided by a 





A A  are equal to zero. In contrast with the case  ∞ = β , where (31) achieved complete stabilization 




A =0 , there is no monetary policy strategy available, 




A A  simultaneously equal to zero. 
58 With  ∞ < β , it is possible to neutralize the announcement effects of symmetric shocks in the 
interval 0 < t < T via a suitable adjustment of m D . It can be derived from the general solution for t < T 
by setting the constants   5 1,..., A A  equal to zero.  4 1,...,A A  stay in proportion with 5 A . Thus, stabilization 
in 0 < t < T is achieved when monetary policy reacts in a way that sets 0 5 = A . In principle, this is 
possible because a change in m D  leads to a permanent change in the steady state level of the real money 
stock  p m − , which in turn is included in  5 A . For details see the analytical appendix.  31
Finally, the paper analyzes interactions between monetary and fiscal policy. It is 
assumed that the common monetary policy tries to stabilize the European economy 
after a symmetric fiscal shock occurring in all EMU member countries 
simultaneously. This fiscal shock may be unanticipated or anticipated. It is shown that 
the ECB may be able to stabilize output around the equilibrium level of output in the 
case of unanticipated fiscal policy. In contrast, anticipated fiscal policies pose a 
problem for the design of ECB policy. Complete stabilization requires both, a time-
inconsistent reaction of monetary policy as well as a high credibility of ECB policy. 
While a time-inconsistent reaction of monetary policy has considerable merits in the 
case of anticipated fiscal policy, it is likely to undermine ECB credibility over time. 
Imposing the requirement that monetary policy has to be time-consistent implies that 
the ECB faces an intertemporal stabilization policy trade-off. Stabilization in one part 
of the adjustment process is necessarily associated with more pronounced fluctuations 
in other parts of the adjustment process. 
 
This positive analysis of the dynamic effects of monetary and fiscal policies in a 
monetary union represents a useful starting point for an interesting research agenda 
about the conduct of stabilization policy in asymmetric three-country models of 
monetary unions. The current paper looks only at one particular asymmetry, which 
attracted widespread attention. One further route would be to look at other types of 
macroeconomic asymmetries and to investigate their implications for the dynamic 
effects of monetary and fiscal policy. Another next step would be to introduce 
dynamic optimizing behavior of the authorities in an effort to stabilize the economy in 
response to shocks. This extension allows to determine the optimal response of the 
ECB to different kinds of shocks and to evaluate the country-specific costs and 
benefits of asymmetric macroeconomic structures. This extension would also allow 
for an analysis of the interactions between monetary and fiscal policy in a dynamic 
game-theoretic context. Finally, the current setup takes the structure and decision rules 
of the private sector as given. A logical next step would be to introduce optimizing 
behavior of the private sector, which is likely to affect in the case of fiscal policy the 
choice between present and future consumption and, consequently, alters the impact 
of fiscal policy. These modifications have been applied to simpler small country and 
two-country models of international policy transmission. It will be interesting to learn 
how these approaches and results translate to the conduct of stabilization policy within 
a monetary union. 
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8. Appendix 
Aggregate and difference system  
The model (1)-(12) is first conveniently transformed into aggregate and difference 
variables and then decomposed as in Aoki (1981): 
(A1)  k g b i a a y + + − − − = ⋅ τ τ α λ 5 2 2 3 * 2 ) 1 ( D  
(A2)  ) ( 3 y y − = ⋅ δ τ α D  
(A3)  τ α 3 − = p p
c  
(A4)  τ 1 0 2 f f y + =  
(A5)  ) * ( 2 2 2 1 0 e i l y l l p m
c D + − + = −  
(A6) 
d d p b b g g a a i a a y ) 2 ( * ~ 2 ) 1 ( ~
5 4 2 1 02 01 2 3 2 + − − + − + − − = ⋅ τ α µ D  
(A7)  ) ( ) 1 ( 2 1
d d d y y p − = + − δ α α D  
(A8) 
d d p f f y ) 2 ( 2 1 + =  
with 
 ) 1 ( 2 1 1 b b a − + − = λ , ) 1 ( 2 1 1 b b a + + − = µ ,  ) (
2
1




22 21 2 > − = a a a , * 2 2 3 0 02 01 y b b a a k + + + = ,  2 1 α α = , 
2 1 y y y + = ,  2 1 τ τ τ + = ,  2 1 g g g + = , 
c c c p p p 2 1 + = , 
c c p p 2 1 = , 
2 1 p p p + = ,  2 1 y y y
d − = ,  2 1 p p p
d − = . 
(A1) to (A5) reduce into the state equations (13) and (14) for the aggregate system; 
(A6) to (A8) collapse into the single state equation (17) for the difference system.  
The unique convergent solution to the aggregate system is given by 
(A9)  ()
t r t r e h A e h A
p m p m
2 1
2 2 1 1
0
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t r e h A



















 for t > T  33
where ) exp( : t r e j
t rj = . The characteristic roots satisfy  2 1 0 r r < < . The corresponding 
characteristic vectors are defined as h1 and h2, where c > 0 is given in the main text: 



























2 h . 
The constants A1, A2 and  1
~
A  are determined by the well-known conditions that the 
jump variable τ  stays continuous at the date of implementation T, whereas the 
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− − − − + − − = τ . 
In the special case T = 0, i.e., with an unanticipated disturbance, only (A10) 
characterizes the solution with  () p m A − − = d ~
1 .  
The steady-state impact of exogenous changes in the growth rate of the money stock 
m D  and government expenditure g1 and g2 on the state variables τ  and  p m −  is 
(A14)  ) d d (
1








τ D  






m l p m +
+
−
− − = −
λ
α D  
The stable (convergent) saddle path S for the aggregate system follows from (A10) as 
(A16)  () () p m p m h − − − = − ) ( 11 τ τ  
The solution to the state equation for the difference system (17) is continuous 
everywhere and given by 
                                                           
59 These conditions for continuity imply that (A9) and (A10) also hold at t = T.  34
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+ γ       for  t > T. 
The characteristic root  0 0 < r  is defined in (17) and  0
) 1 (











The logarithmic-linear specification of the model (1)-(12) assumes the initial values of 
corresponding variables to be identical. This means that, for example, the initial value 
of the price differential p
d is  0 0 =
d p . Since  22 21 a a > , or equivalently  0 ~
2 > a , we 
assume without loss of generality in the IS-equation (A6)  02 01 a a > . The steady-state 
values of the difference variables only respond to asymmetric disturbances such as 
2 1 d d g g ≠  or to changes in the level of world interest rates i*. Using the notation 
d d d p p p 0 1 d − =  the model yields 
(A19)  *) d ~ 2 d d (
2 ) 2 (
1
d 2 2 1
5 4 2 1
i a g g








Effects of Monetary Policy 
An increase in the growth rate of the money stock by one unit ( 1 = m d D ) implies for the 
constants  A1 and  1
~




2 1 1 > ⋅ = =
− T r e l A A . The impact effect at the date of the announcement (0+) of the 
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On impact, the common currency depreciates ( 0 ) 0 ( τ τ < + ) but immediately starts to 
re-appreciate ( 0 ) 0 ( > + τ D ). In conjunction with (18) we know that real interest rates  35
fall in both member countries. Furthermore, aggregate output increases beyond the 
full employment level (cf. (15)). In the course of the adjustment process, the union 
experiences a real appreciation and a decline in the real money stock (Figure 1). The 
link with the consumption based real money stock 
c p m −  is given by 
τ α 3 + − = − p m p m
c . With  0 ) 0 ( τ τ < + , 
c p m −  falls on impact. Using (A9) and 
(A10), it can be shown that 
c p m −  declines further throughout the subsequent 
adjustment process as long as the weak condition  0 1 11 3 > + h α  holds. In the long-run 
and as a result of  0 d d = m D τ , both price indices fall by the same amount. 
The impact behavior of the output differential  2 1 y y y
d − =  follows from (A6) and 
0 ) 0 ( > + τ D , which imply that y
d increases  
(A21)  0 ) 0 (
) 1 ( ~
) 0 (







In the subsequent adjustment process, gradual increases in the price differential 
2 1 p p p
d − =  resulting from excess demand in the goods market (cf. (A7)) lower y
d 
again (cf. (A6)) and lead to a cyclical reversal. Since  0 =
d y  in the case  0 > m d D , (A7) 
implies  0 = =
d d y y  if and only if  0 =
d p D . Setting the derivative of (A17) with 
respect to time equal to zero allows for the determination of the exact timing of this 
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The solution to this equation is labeled t*. It is given in (20) and independent from T. 
Note that the same reversal point t* can be derived for t > T from (A18) by again 
setting 0 =
d p D . In the case  0 > m d D , we previously derived  1 1
~
A A =  and 0 =
d p d  so 
that (A18) is equivalent to (A17) and (20) follows immediately.
60  
 
                                                           
60 This equivalence does not hold for other disturbances such as fiscal policy (see in the following 
(A26)). 
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Effects of Fiscal Policy 
A symmetric increase in government expenditure ( 0 2 1 > = dg dg ) leads in the steady 
state to an increase in the terms of trade τ (cf. A14). The impact on the long-run real 
money stock () p m −  is indeterminate. Under the realistic assumption  1 1 3 f l > α , (A15) 
implies  () 0 d d < − g p m . In contrast, the long-run consumption based real money 
stock unambiguously increases as (A4) and (A5) jointly imply 
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Concerning the signs of the constants (A12) and (A13), it can be shown in the case of 
fiscal policy using the results for the characteristic roots  1 r  and  2 r  that, irrespective of 




> − − τ
h
p m . It then follows from (A12) that A1 < 0. 
Assuming  1 1 3 f l > α  implies  0
~
1 > A  for all  0 ≥ T .  
Using (A20) for the impact effect of an announced fiscal expansion, we find 
0 0 ) 0 ( , 0 ) 0 ( , ) 0 ( y y < + < + > + τ τ τ D , i.e., a real appreciation, a rise in real interest rates 
and a fall in aggregate output. At the date of implementation T, aggregate output rises 
discontinuously. The size of the jump in T does not depend on the time span between 
the announcement and the implementation T and it is unambiguously larger than the 
steady state impact  0 1 y y y d − = : 
(A24)  )) ( ) ( ( d ) ( ) (
3 − − + + = − − + T T y T y T y τ τ
δ
α D D  
 with 
(A24a)  0 d )
~
( ) ( ) ( 1 1 11 1 1
1 > − = − = − − + τ τ τ r e r h A A T T
T r D D  
The output differential falls  ) 0 ) 0 ( ( < +
d y , which follows from (A21) and  . 0 ) 0 ( < + τ D  
Using (A7),  0 ) 0 ( < +
d p D , such that in the adjustment process the price differential 
2 1 p p p
d − =  starts to fall allowing the output differential y
d to gradually rise again. If  37
T is sufficiently large, we find a reversal point t* for y
d in the interval 0 < t < T. t* is 
identical with (20).
61  
At the date of implementation T, the output differential y
d increases discontinuously as 
(A6) and (A24a) imply 
(A25)  )) ( ) ( (
) 1 ( ~
) ( ) (
3 2 − − +
−
= − − + T T
a
T y T y
d d τ τ
µ
α D D  
    0 d








Using (A7), we know that the jump in the output differential is accompanied by a 
jump in the inflation differential. The price differential  2 1 p p p
d − =  starts to rise after 
T allowing the output differential y
d to gradually fall again (cf. Figure 7). In contrast 
with the case of monetary policy, symmetric fiscal policy gives rise to an additional 
reversal point t** where the output differential y
d again changes sign. t** is a reversal 
point of y
d in the period t > T. The same reversal point holds for 
d p D . Setting the 















































In the special case T = 0, i.e., an unanticipated symmetric increase in government 
expenditure, t** and t* coincide such that only a single date exists at which a sign 
reversal of y
d occurs. Note that this result also holds in the case of a change in the 
growth rate of the money stock m D  since 0 = ∂ ∂ m D τ  implies t** = t*.  
 
Coordination of Monetary and Fiscal Policy 
An unanticipated symmetric increase in government expenditure leads on impact to 
an overproportionate reaction of aggregate output ( 1 ) 0 ( y y > + , if T = 0) and to 
                                                           
61 As t* is independent from T, a sufficiently small T (i.e., T < t*) implies that in this case no reversal 
point exists in the interval 0 < t < T.  The same proposition holds in the case of a change in the rate of 
monetary growth.  38
divergent output developments within the union. An immediate stabilization of  y  at 
the new steady level  1 y  (i.e.,  1 y y ≡ for all t > 0) can be achieved as long as  0 ≡ τ D  (cf. 
A2). Since 




= τ D , this requires a reaction of monetary policy, which generates 
0
~
1 = A . In the case T = 0, the constant is  () p m A − − = d ~
1 . On this basis, we derive the 
reaction function of monetary policy (31) for  ) 0 ( d + m D . If the expansionary symmetric 
fiscal policy  0 d d 2 1 > = g g  is accompanied by a restrictive monetary policy (31), 
aggregate output will instantaneously jump into the new steady state 1 y . 
Correspondingly, also the state variables τ  and  p m −  immediately adopt their steady 
state values. As  0 = τ D  and  0 d =
d p , (17) and (A7) imply  0 = =
d d y p D  for all t > 0. 
The policy rule (31) also prevents divergent output and inflation developments within 
the union. Overall, (31) achieves a complete stabilization, i.e., a stabilization of both, 
the aggregate as well as the difference system.
62  
An anticipated symmetric increase in government expenditure has implications before 
and after the implementation at date T. A complete stabilization of both, the aggregate 
as well as the difference system, requires a monetary policy reaction, which implies A1 
= 0 and 0
~
1 = A . A1 = 0 can be achieved by the announcement at t = 0 that monetary 
policy turns expansionary at T > 0 using (A12), (A14) and (A15). The announcement 
is assumed to be credible such that the following rate of monetary growth from T 
onward is anticipated (ant) by the private sector: 






















If  m D actually increases in T, it intensifies the already expansionary impact of fiscal 
policy in the period t > T. This is reflected in the constant  1
~
A  in (A13), which turns 
out to be larger than under a passive monetary policy. The complete stabilization of 
the aggregate and the difference system before and after the implementation date T 
                                                           
62 In the case of asymmetric fiscal policy ( 2 1 d d g g ≠ ), full stabilization within the difference system is 
no longer possible since 
d d y p d 0 d ≠ ≠ . (A18) shows that even with  0
~
1 = A , differential adjustment 
processes still occur. These adjustment processes are independent from the aggregate variable τ D , such 
that the output differentials within the union are “smoothed” compared with the case of passive 
monetary policy.   39
requires a time inconsistent monetary policy in T, i.e., not as announced an expansion 
but a reduction in the rate of growth of the money stock according to (31).  
A time consistent monetary policy is not able to achieve complete output stabilization 
throughout the overall adjustment process. The ECB faces an intertemporal policy 
tradeoff: Either she stabilizes the overall system in the anticipation period before T, 
i.e., sets A1 = 0 by announcing in t = 0 an appropriate increase in m   for T > 0, which 
implies in the period after the implementation in comparison with a passive monetary 
policy a larger  1
~
A  and larger cyclical imbalances. Or she stabilizes the system after T, 
i.e., sets  0
~
1 = A  by announcing in t = 0 for T > 0 an appropriate reduction in m  . 
However, this raises the absolute value of A1 and amplifies the recession in the 
anticipation period  already caused by the contractionary announcement effects of 
fiscal policy. 
 
Robustness: The case  2 1 αααα αααα >  
The state equations of the aggregate system now depend on the variable p
d in the 
difference system, and the dynamic equations for the aggregate variables τ  and 
) ( p m−  can no longer be solved independently. In the discussion of the modifications 














 0 ~ ) ( : 2 2 1 2 < − − = a α α β  
 0 ~ ) 1 ( : 2 3 3 < − − = a α δ β  
 0 ) ( ) 1 ( : 2 2 1 2 1 4 > − − + − = a α α δ µ α α β  










 0 : 3 2 4 1 > − = ∆ β β β β  
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63 0 1 > β , if  0 ) 1 ( 2 3 3 > − − a α δ λ α . This assumption was already made in the case  2 1 α α = . It is a 
sufficient condition for the saddle path property of the aggregate system.  40
Then, the system matrix on the left side of (22) has a positive determinant  ∆ 2 l  such 
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γ . 
The determinant of (A29) is  ) /( ) 2 ( / ) ( 2 5 4 5 2 3 2 4 1 ∆ + = − l b b b l δ γ γ γ γ > 0. The 





























The discriminant is positive, which implies that the characteristic roots  0 r  and  1 r  are 
real. Furthermore, because of  0 4 1 < + γ γ , both roots are negative with  0 0 1 < < r r . It 
follows that the dynamic system (A29) has the saddle path property. The 
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64 0 > ∆ , as long as  2
~ a  is not very large, i.e., that the differences in the semi-interest elasticities a21 and 
a22 are limited in size.  41
 













h   ) 1 , 0 ( = j . 
The term  6 3γ γ  can be considered sufficiently small such that  0 1 < j h . The sign of  j h2  
is indeterminate. Typically,  0 4 1 4 0 r r − > > − γ γ . This implies that  21 20 0 h h > > .  
The unique convergent solution of the state vector  )' , , ( p m p
d − τ  follows as  
(A32) 
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  for t < T 
(A33) 
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   for  t > T. 
The five constants are determined using the conditions that the predetermined 
variables 
d p  and  p m −  are continuous in t = 0 and t = T while the jump variable τ  is 
continuous in T: 
 0 21 1 20 0 = + h A h A  
 0 2 1 0 = + + A A A  
(A34) 
T r T r d T r T r d e h A e h A p e h A e h A p
1 0 1 0
21 1 20 0 1 21 1 20 0 0
~ ~ + + = + +  
  () ()
T r T r T r T r T r e A e A p m e A e A e A p m
1 0 2 1 0
1 0 1 2 1 0 0
~ ~ + + − = + + + −  
 
T r T r T r T r e h A e h A e h A e h A
1 0 1 0
11 1 10 0 1 11 1 10 0 0
~ ~ + + = + + τ τ  


















The third and the fifth equation in (A34) define a subsystem, which can be solved for 
0 0
~ A A −  and  1 1
~
A A − : 
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with   0 20 11 21 10 > − = h h h h χ . 
It follows: 
(A37)  ) d d (
1 ~
11 21 0 0




(A38)  ) d d (
1 ~
10 20 1 1




Inserting (A36) into the fourth equation of (A34), we yield for  2 A  the following 
expression, which replaces (A12): 
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In the case of monetary policy  0 > m d D , 0 2 < A  and owing to (A32) and (A35)  
(A40)  0 2
20 21
0 11 1 10 0 0 ) 0 ( τ
χ
τ τ τ <
−
− = + + = + A
h h
h A h A  
Furthermore,  
(A41)  () 2 0 10 21 1 11 20
20 21
1 11 1 0 10 0
1
) 0 ( A r h h r h h
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r h A r h A −
−
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65 
and  
(A42)  () 0 ) 0 ( 2 1 0
20 21
21 20
1 21 1 0 20 0 > −
−
− = + = + A r r
h h
h h
r h A r h A p
d D  
since  ()
0
) ( ) (
) )( (
6 3 2 4 5 1 0






− γ γ γ γ
γ
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Due to sign = + ) 0 ( y sign  ) 0 ( + τ D  and sign = + ) 0 (
d ys i g n ) 0 ( +
d p D  we find that on impact 
- as in the case  2 1 α α =  - an increase in  y  as well as 
d y and a fall in τ . Because of 
                                                           
65 The following relationship holds:  χ γ 1 0 10 21 1 11 20 − = − r h h r h h . This follows from the characteristic 
equations  11 1 21 2 11 1 h r h h = + γ γ ,  10 0 20 2 10 1 h r h h = + γ γ , by multiplying them with  20 h and  21 h  respectively 
and subtracting them from each other.  43
(A43) 








1 1 α α τ α − − − − = −  
and 
(A44) 








2 2 α α τ α − + − − = −  
we yield in the case  2 1 α α >  different developments in real interest rates. On impact, 
c p i 1 1 D −  falls more strongly than 
c p i 2 2 D − . In the subsequent adjustment process, we find 
qualitatively the same adjustment patterns for  y  and 
d y  as in the case  2 1 α α = . 
Interestingly, we find the same reversal point 
* t  in 
d y . Following (A35) we have 
(A45)  ⇔ = ⇔ = 0 0
d d p y D D  
  () ⇔ = + −
−
⇔ = + 0 0 2 1 0
20 21
21 20
1 21 1 0 20 0
1 0 1 0 A e r e r
h h
h h
e r h A e r h A
t r t r t r t r  
  0
1 0
1 0 = + −
t r t r e r e r  
The last equation is identical with (A22) such that again equation (20) determines t*. 
In the case of a symmetric fiscal expansion and analogous to the case  2 1 α α = it is 
reasonable to assume  0 2 > A . With  21 20 0 h h > >  it follows that  0 , 0 1 0 < < A A . Under 
the previous assumption  () 0 d / d < − g p m  (i.e.,  1 1 3 f l > α ), we find the constants  0
~ A  
and  1
~ A  for all  0 ≥ T  to be positive. Using (A40) to (A43) we find as a mirror image to 
the case of monetary policy:  
(A46)  0 ) 0 ( τ τ > + ,  0 ) 0 ( < + τ D , 0 ) 0 ( < +
d p D ,  ()
*
1 1 ) 0 ( i p i
c > + − D . 
This implies for the output variables  0 ) 0 ( y y < +  and  0 ) 0 ( < +
d y . The subsequent 
development of y  and 
d y is qualitatively identical with the case  2 1 α α = . At the date 
of implementation T, the output variables jump as follows: 
(A47)  () ) ( ) ( d ) ( ) (
3 − − + + = − − + T T y T y T y τ τ
δ
α D D   
with  
(A48)  () ()
T r T r e r h A A e r h A A T T
1 0
1 11 1 1 0 10 0 0
~ ~ ) ( ) ( − + − = − − + τ τ D D    44
      () τ
χ
d r h h r h h 1 11 20 0 10 21
1
+ − =  
      () 0
1
1 1 > − = − = τ γ τ χ γ
χ
d d  
and  
(A49)  () ) ( ) (
1
d ) ( ) (
2 1 − − +
+ −
+ = − − + T p T p y T y T y




 with   0 d =
d y  in the case  0 d d 2 1 > = g g  and  
(A50)  () ()
T r T r d d e r h A A e r h A A T p T p
1 0
1 21 1 1 0 20 0 0
~ ~ ) ( ) ( − + − = − − + D D  
          0 d ) (
1
0 1 21 20 > − = τ
χ
r r h h  
For 
d y  we find - as in the case  2 1 α α = - two sign reversals. If a reversal point t* 
exists in the interval  T t < < 0 , it is determined by - following (A45) - equation (20). 
For  T t > , we find the following reversal point t** in the behavior of 
d y : 
(A51)  ⇔ = ⇔ = 0 0
d d p y D  
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−  is equal to unity such that t** = 
t*. 
 
Monetary policy reaction to  0 d d 2 1 >>>> ==== g g  in the case  2 1 αααα αααα >>>>  
In the case of an unanticipated symmetric fiscal expansion (T = 0), complete 
stabilization requires  0
~ ~
1 0 = = A A (cf. (A33)). The constants are    45



















such that an unanticipated monetary policy, which generates  0 ) ( d = − p m , stabilizes 
the overall system.
66 As in the case  2 1 α α = , the appropriate response is determined by 
the reaction function (31). In the case of an anticipated symmetric fiscal expansion (T 
> 0), complete stabilization in the interval  T t < < 0  requires  0 2 1 0 = = = A A A . Using 
(A35), this condition is fulfilled as long as monetary policy sets  0 2 = A . From (A39), 
the previous reaction function for monetary policy (A27) now takes the more general 
form  






















D .  
The actual implementation of the expansionary monetary policy (A53) in T reinforces 
the expansionary fiscal policy in the period t > T; a complete stabilization requires in 
T an unanticipated, time-inconsistent restrictive monetary policy. Following (A33) 
and (A52), stabilization in the interval t > T requires the two conditions  0 ~
0 = A  and 
0
~
1 = A  to hold, which can be attained via the reaction function (31). 
Ruling out this time-inconsistent reaction as a feasible policy option, monetary policy 
can stabilize the overall system only in the anticipation period 0 < t < T, with a policy 
reaction of the form (A53). In contrast with the case  2 1 α α = , it is impossible to 
achieve via a monetary policy announcement in t = 0 complete stabilization in the 
period after the fiscal policy implementation, t > T, because the constants  0
~ A  and  1
~
A  
in (A37) and (A38) can not be set simultaneously equal to zero.
67  
                                                           
66 In the case of an asymmetric fiscal expansion as, for example,  2 1 d 0 d g g = > , it follows  0 d ≠
d p . In 
this case, the equations for  j A
~







− . As a 
result, a change in m D d  no longer achieves complete stabilization of the aggregate system since it is 
impossible to set  0
~
A  and  1
~
A  simultaneously to zero.  
67 To see this, insert (A35) and (A39) into (A37) and (A38). In the case of monetary policy or a 
symmetric fiscal policy,  0 d =
d p  holds. Then, setting  0
~
A  and  1
~
A  equal to zero implies different 
reaction functions for m D . With 2 1 α α > , only unanticipated fiscal policy can be completely stabilized 
via monetary policy. With anticipated fiscal policy, even an unanticipated monetary policy in T fails to 
achieve complete stabilization in the period after implementation t > T.  46
Sluggish output adjustment in goods markets 
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The number of stable characteristic roots is inferred to be even. With four 
predetermined state variables (y, y
d, p
d,  p m − ) we have at maximum four stable roots 
(r1, ..., r4). Furthermore, one unstable root  2 5 / 1 l r =  exists, such that in the case  ℜ ∈ i r  
with ri < 0 (i = 1,...,4) a saddle path equilibrium prevails.
68 In this case exists a unique 
convergent solution  )' , , , , ( p m p y y x





















j e h A x x  for t > T  
The characteristic vector  )' , , ( 5 1 j j j h h h l =  refers to the respective characteristic root 
) 5 1 ( ≤ ≤ j rj , while the constants  4 1 5 1
~ , , ~ , , , A A A A l l  are determined by the 
following conditions: 
1.  The five state variables are continuous in T. 
2.  The four predetermined variables y, y
d, p
d,  p m −  are continuous in t = 0.  
The characteristic vector h5 belonging to the unstable root  2 5 / 1 l r =  can be defined as a 
unit vector  )' 1 , 0 , 0 , 0 , 0 ( 5 = h  and the fifth component h5j of the characteristic vector hj 
















j j e h A x e h A  
                                                           
68 Numerical simulations with realistic parameter values show that the system has typically four stable 
characteristic roots. Complex conjugate solutions are also conceivable. However, in some parameter 
settings we find merely two stable roots. This case leads to explosive solutions to the dynamic system 
(27) (Turnovsky (2000), p. 147; Buiter (1984)). 








ij jh A  ;  i = 1 , 2, 4, 5 
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Denoting the matrix preceding  )' , , ( 4 1 A A   with H, we find a proportional relation 
between Ai  ) 4 1 ( ≤ ≤ i  and A5 of the following form
70 
(A60)  5 A A i i χ =  












4 + + − = − − = χ
     ) 4 1 ( ≤ ≤ i  
where cof4i  ) 4 1 ( ≤ ≤ i  denotes the (4, i) cofactor of H, i.e., the subdeterminant of H, 
which results from the deletion of the 4th row and the ith column of the matrix H. 
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(A63)  () p m e A e A A e A A e A A e A A
T r T r T r T r T r − = + − + − + − + − d ) ~ ( ) ~ ( ) ~ ( ) ~ (
5 4 3 2 1
5 4 4 3 3 2 2 1 1  
For A5 it follows 
                                                           
70 (A60) substitutes for (A35) in the case of sluggish output adjustment  ) ( ∞ < β .  48
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In the case  0 d d = =
d d p y  we find, as a result of  τ d d 1⋅ = f y ,  i i A A ~ −  to be 
proportional with respect to τ d : 
(A66)  τ d ~ ⋅ Ψ = − i i i A A   ) 4 1 ( ≤ ≤ i  
 with 







i f o c f f o c
H
+ ⋅ − = Ψ
+  
where  i f o c 1
~  and  i f o c 3
~  represent the (1, i) and (3, i) cofactor of  T H ~ . 
In the case of monetary policy  0 d > m D ,  0 d = τ  and in conjunction with (A66)  i i A A ~ =  
) 4 1 ( ≤ ≤ i . Then, (A64) implies  () 0 d
5
5 < − =
− p m e A
T r  . 
The characteristic roots r1, ..., r5 are assumed real and the corresponding characteristic 
vectors can be expressed in a general form by using the definition of hj 
(A67)  j j j h r h D = ⋅   ) 5 , , 1 ( l = j  
with  ) ( ij d D =  and solved analogously to (27). h5 represents the unit vector 
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1 =    ) 4 1 ( ≤ ≤ j  
As a result of  0 31 53 51 > + d d r d j , h1j > 0 and h3j < 0. Furthermore,  0 ) ( 5 21 42 > − r r r d d j j , 
0 42 24 < d d ,  d22 < 0, but  0 ) ( 42 24 22 <
>
+ − d d r r d j j . It follows that the sign of h4j is 
indeterminate and, owing to (A69), the sign of h2j is also indeterminate. This implies 
that the constants A1,..., A4 can no longer be signed (cf. (A60)). 
Numerical simulations with realistic parameter values show that the jump variable τ  
behaves qualitatively in the same fashion as with instantaneous output adjustment 
( ∞ = β ). The output variables y and y
d are here continuous everywhere. On impact, y 
and  y
d no longer jump, but respond gradually. The output differential y
d remains 
continuous at time T and has - as in the case  ∞ = β  - a reversal point t*, which does 
not depend on T. Using (A60) and (A69), t*  is  the solution to the following 
equation:
71 
(A70)  ⇔ = ⇔ = 0 0
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71 (A70) replaces (A45). It can no longer be solved analytically for t because it now includes four 
exponentials.   50
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 0 ) 1 (
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j j e h cof  
With a symmetric fiscal policy (0 d d 2 1 > = g g ), y
d experiences two sign reversals. As 
long as one sign reversal occurs before the date of implementation T, it is determined 
by (A70). 
The dynamic effects of an unanticipated  symmetric fiscal expansion can only be 
neutralized by monetary policy as long as the conditions  0 ~ , 0 ~ , 0 ~
3 2 1 = = = A A A  and 
0
~
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Due to  τ d 1 f y d =  and 
d d p y d 0 d = = , i A ~  is 
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τ    ) 4 1 ( ≤ ≤ i  
In contrast with the previous case of instantaneous output adjustment ) ( ∞ = β ,  i A ~  
now depends on  τ d (cf. (A52)), because the cofactor cof1i is not equal to zero. With 
considerable algebra, it is possible to show that for  j i ≠ ,  j j i i cof cof cof cof 4 1 4 1 / / ≠  
holds. Therefore, in the case T = 0 it is not possible for monetary policy to set 
0 ~ ~ ~ ~
4 3 2 1 = = = = A A A A  by using a change of m D , i.e., to achieve complete stabilization.  51
This implies that also in the case of anticipated fiscal policy it is impossible to 
achieve complete stabilization even with a time-inconsistent monetary policy. 
However, it is possible to neutralize the impact of the announcement effect of fiscal 
policy. Using (A60), this requires setting A5 = 0. (A60) and (A66) imply 














Ψ − − = ∑
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5 T r T r j e p m e A . 
The requirement A5 = 0 implies the following monetary policy reaction in T > 0 to be 
credibly announced in t = 0 :
72 



























As long as the effect of fiscal policy ( 0 ) ( > T dg ) in the interval (0, T)
 on output  y  is 
negative as in Figure 13, monetary policy has to be expansionary ( 0 ) ( d
ant > T m D ). 
Since we assume  1 1 3 f l > α , this requires . 0
4
1
3 1 1 ∑
=
< − < Ψ
j
T r
j f l e
j α  
 
                                                           
72 (A75) is a generalization of (A53).  52
References 
Aoki, M. (1981). Dynamic Analysis of Open Economies. New York: Basic Books. 
Argy, V. (1994). International Macroeconomics. Theory and Policy. London, New 
York: Routledge. 
Bank for International Settlements (1994). National Differences in Interest Rate 
Transmission. Basle. 
Bank for International Settlements (1995). Financial Structure and the Monetary 
Policy Transmission Mechanism. Basle. 
Barro, R. J., and D. B. Gordon (1983). Rules, Discretion and Reputation in a Model of 
Monetary Policy. Journal of Monetary Economics 12: 101-121. 
Bhandari, J. S. (1997). Studies in International Macroeconomics, New York. 
Buiter, W. H., and M. Miller (1982). Real Exchange Rate Overshooting and the 
Output Cost of Bringing Down Inflation. European Economic Review 18: 85-123. 
Buiter, W. H. (1984). Saddlepoint Problems in Continuous Time Rational 
Expectations Models: A General Method and Some Macroeconomic Examples. 
Econometrica 52, 665-680. 
Cecchetti, S. G. (1999). Legal Structure, Financial Structure, and the Monetary Policy 
Transmission Mechanism. Economic Policy Review, Federal Reserve Bank of New 
York, 9-28. 
Clausen, V. (1998). Money Demand and Monetary Policy in Europe. Review of World 
Economics 134 (4): 712-740. 
Clausen, V. (2001). Asymmetric Monetary Transmission in Europe. Berlin, 
Heidelberg, New York: Springer. 
Cottarelli, C., and A. Kourelis (1994). Financial Structure, Bank Lending Rates, and 
the Transmission Mechanism of Monetary Policy. IMF Staff Papers 41 (4): 587-
623. 
Daseking, C. (1996). Stabilization Policy in a Currency Area and the Impact of Wage 
Rigidities. Jahrbücher für Nationalökonomie und Statistik 215: 171-187. 
De Bondt, G. J. (2000). Financial Structure and Monetary Transmission in Europe: A 
Cross-Country Study. Cheltenham: Elgar. 
De Grauwe, P. (2000). Monetary Policy in the Presence of Asymmetries. Journal of 
Common Market Studies, 38 (4): 593-612. 
Dornbusch, R., C. A. Favero, and F. Giavazzi (1998). Immediate Challenges for the 
ECB - Issues in Formulating a Single Monetary Policy. Economic Policy 14 (26): 
15-64. 
Ehrmann, M. (2000). Comparing Monetary Policy Transmission across European 
Countries. Review of World Economics 136 (1): 58-83. 
ECB (1999a). Longer-term Developments and Cyclical Variations in Key Economic 
Indicators across European Countries, Monthly Report 1 (7): 33-54. 
ECB (1999b). Inflation Differentials in a Monetary Union. Monthly Report 1 (10): 36-
44.  53
ECB (2000). Monetary Policy Transmission in the Euro Area. Monthly Report 2 (7): 
44-58. 
Guiso, L., A. K. Kashyap, F. Panetta, and D. Terlizzese (1999). Will a Common 
European Monetary Policy Have Asymmetric Effects? Economic Perspectives, 
Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago 23 (4): 56-75. 
Kakes, J. (2000). Monetary Transmission in Europe: The Role of Financial Markets 
and Credit. Cheltenham: Elgar.  
Kydland, F. E. and E. C. Prescott (1977). Rules rather than Discretion. The 
Inconsistency of Optimal Plans. Journal of Political Economy 85: 473-492. 
Lane, P. R. (2001). The New Open Macroeconomics: A Survey. Journal of 
International Economics 54 (2): 235-266. 
Läufer, N. K. A., S. Sundararajan (1994). The International Transmission of 
Economic Shocks in a Three-Country World under Mixed Exchange Rates. 
Journal of International Money and Finance 13 (4): 429-446. 
McCallum, B. T., J. K. Whitaker. The Effectiveness of Fiscal Feedback Rules and 
Automatic Stabilizers under Rational Expectations, Journal of Monetary 
Economics 5, 171-186. 
Mojon, B. (2000). Financial Structure and the Interest Channel of the ECB Monetary 
Policy. ECB Working Paper No. 40. Frankfurt a. M. 
Obstfeld, M., Rogoff, K. (1995). Exchange Rate Dynamics Redux, Journal of 
Political Economy 103 (3), 624-660. 
Ramaswamy, R., and T. Sloek (1998). The Real Effects of Monetary Policy in the 
European Union: What Are the Differences? IMF Staff Papers 45 (2): 374-396. 
Turnovsky, S. J. (2000). Methods of Macroeconomic Dynamics. Second Edition, 
Cambridge, MA: MIT press. 
Turnovsky, S. J. (1986). Monetary and Fiscal Policy under Perfect Foresight: A 
Symmetric Two-Country Analysis, Economica 53: 139-157. 
Wohltmann, H.-W. (1993). Transmission nationaler Wirtschaftspolitiken in einer 
Wechselkursunion. Jahrbücher für Nationalökonomie und Statistik 211: 73-89. 
Wohltmann, H.-W. (1994a). Die intertemporalen Auswirkungen antizipierter 
stabilisierungspolitischer Maßnahmen. Jahrbuch für Sozialwissenschaft 45: 92-
120. 
Wohltmann, H.-W. (1994b). International Policy Transmission in a Dynamic Two-
Country Model with Intermediate Inputs. Jahrbuch für Sozialwissenschaft 45: 273-
311. 
Wohltmann, H.-W., and F. Bulthaupt (1999). Intertemporale Output- und 
Beschäftigungseffekte angebotsorientierter Politikmaßnahmen in einer 




Wohltmann, H.-W., F. Bulthaupt, and W. Krömer (1998). Wirtschaftspolitische 
Koordination in einer symmetrischen und asymmetrischen Wechselkursunion. In: 
K. Farmer, H.-W. Wohltmann (Hrsg.), Quantitative Wirtschaftspolitik in offenen 
Volkswirtschaften: Theoretische Ansätze und aktuelle Entwicklungen. Münster: 
LIT. 
Wohltmann, H.-W. and V. Clausen (2001). Geldpolitik, Fiskalpolitik und 
ausländische Zinsschocks in einer asymmetrischen Währungsunion. Kredit und 
Kapital 34 (2): 149-177. 
 
 